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Essay

The Crisis Of The State In Africa
by Shaheen Mozaffar

n contempotary Africa, as everywhere in the world today, the state
has assumed a central role in a wider
range of tasks such as fostering and
maintaining economic growth, providing for the welfare of the citizens
and ensuring law and order. But since
gaining independence in the 1960s,
African states have exhibited a steadily
diminishing capacity for performing
their accustomed functions. This has
given rise to the now widely-accepted
aphorism that the state in Africa is in
crisis. Evidence of this crisis is readily
found in several areas.
It is, first of all, found in the lack of
sustained economic growth, despite
the disproportionately high expenditures undertaken by African states since
independence. In 1967, for example,
African state expenditures, excluding
South Africa, averaged about 15% of
the Gross Domestic Product or GOP
(the total value of all goods and services produced within the country); by
1982, they had risen to over 30% of
GOP. Increased state expenditures produced economic growth only in exceptional cases in the 1970s, for example,
in Botswana, Gabon, Ivory Coast, Kenya and Malawi, and actually produced
decline in growth overall. However,
per capita GOP growth rates across the
continent, excluding South Africa, fell
from 1.3% in the 1960s to -.4% in
1983.
Second, evidence of state crisis is
found in the pervasive corruption and
mismanagement among public officials, from the policeman on the beat to
the highest levels of the ruling circles.
For example, President Mobutu of
Zaire has reputedly amassed a personal
fortune conservatively estimated to be
$1 billion. The degree of corruption
certainly varies within and across countries, but in general, the absence of
public morality, or at least the perception of its absence, in the exercise of
state power has severely reduced the
credibility of the state in the eyes of the
citizens. As a consequence, large segments of the populations in many
African countries have opted to withdraw from the formal economy regulated by the state, and derive their
livelihoods from informal social networks based on personal friendships
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and family ties outside state control.
According to some estimates, these
informal economies account for almost
half of all economic activity in many
countries. The growing significance of
these parallel markets has recenty impelled the World Bank to commission
several studies on their scope and
impact on development policies urged
by the Bank on African countries.

African states have exhibited
a steadily diminishing
capacity for performing their
accustomed functions in
society.

A variety of political, social and
economic indicators, thus, clearly attest to the crisis of the state in Africa.
What is not so clear, however, is the
reason or reasons, why and how such a
situation has come to pass. Conventionally, two alternative explanations have been offered. One explanation emphasizes internal factors:
1) the incompetence of African leaders and their inadvisable policies,
2) the "traditional" African cultural
values which allegedly promote
"backward" attitudes deemed inappropriate for a modern society,
and
3) the more objective factors of overpopulation, lack of skilled personnel and scarce natural resources.
The other explanation emphasizes
external factors:
1) the Western military and economic domination of the contemporary international system,
2) the resulting perpetuation of African dependency on Western aid,
and
3) the attempt by Western countries
to advance their "imperialist"
interests by supporting corrupt
and unpopular governments in
Africa.

An objective evaluation of the validity of these explanations is complicated by their biases. Each assumes
African states and leaders to be second
rate. Both explanations, moreover,
offer a simplistic one-d~mensionalview
of what is otherwise an inordinatley
complex situation. Most significantly,
both ignore the deeper historical and
structural factors which shaped the
origin and development of the modern
state in Africa, and which continue to
influence its performance today.

The Modern State
and its Colonial Variant
The modern sovereign state, in concept and organization, originated in
medieval Europe with the breakdown
of feudalism and the accompanying
rise of absolute monarchies. Over the
next two centuries, it evolved in close
conjuction with the development of
modern capitalism. The progressive
changes of the European state-from
the absolutist-mercantilist state to
the liberal-democratic state to the
social-welfare state-sim ultaneousl y
shaped, and were shaped by the wider
socioeconomic changes wrought by
capitalism-the decline of the aristocracy, the rise of the urban
bourgeoisie and the expansion of the
industrial working class. Thus, in
Europe, the modern state and civil
society evolved interdependently, as a
result of which the state came to acquire legitimacy in the eyes of the
people because its laws and institutions
embodied their cultural values and
philosophical aspirations.
In Africa, however, the joint historical processes of state formation and
capitalist development were disconnected. The modern state was imposed
on Africa by colonial powers who
sought economic and military gains.
The colonial state, moreover, was
imposed on African societies which
were predominantly based on smallscale peasant farming. This historical
anomaly produced deep-seated contradictions both in the very nature of the
state imposed on Africa and in its
impact on African societies. The colonial state imposed on Africa in the latenineteenth century had no independent standing in international law, but
derived its legal status from the sover-

MELILLA

CAPE
VERDE
IS.
Praia

0 .. :

. o~·
THE

GAMB1A-~"--':>

Banjul

eignty of the respective colonial
powers. Furthermore, having secured
their African colonies by conquest, the
colonial powers selectively excluded
the doctrines of constitutionalism,
liberalism and civil liberties, which had
effectively curbed the arbitrary exercise of state power in Europe. And
because Africans were considered unfit
to live in "civilized" national communities, they were denied the full
status as a nation. Thus, African states
lacked an important legitimizing force,
that of nationhood. The colonial state
was established, then, as a highly
authoritarian state whose domination
was rationalized by a dubious racialistpaternalist ideology. Africans were
seen by their oppressors as inferiors
who needed help. Colonial power was
excercised through a coercive bureaucratic apparatus.
The Impact
of the Colonial State
The bureaucratic-authoritarian tradition of the colonial state has remained the dominant political tradition in contemporary Africa, despite
attempts by European and African
leaders to introduce western-style democracy on the continent. After World
War II, confronted with a growing
African nationalism and a changed
international environment in which
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colonies fell from favor, the colonial
powers hurriedly introduced democratic tradition as the ideal political
system, the former because that was
the only tradition they knew, and the
latter because they saw the democratic
ideals of liberty, freedom and equality
(many African nationalist leaders quoted Thomas Jefferson in their speeches)
as a powerful philosophical weapon to
challenge the colonial powers in their
own language. However, the potential
for the success of the newly introduced
democratic institutions was not great.
The constitutionally-sanctioned autocratic powers of the colonial state-

legislation by executive decree, executive supremacy, suspension of civil
liberties-were retained in the laws and
institutions of the post-colonial state in
Africa. At independence, therefore,
the new African elites inherited a state
which embodied two traditions-the
colonial bureaucratic-authoritarian tradition and the newer democratic tradition-whose underlying values were
profoundly at odds with each other.
After independence, the democratic
institutions were discarded by African
elites because the underlying liberal
values of these institutionf: did not
have sufficient time to take root in
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The Crisis continued

African political cultures in the brief
period between 1945 and the 1960s,
when decolonization occured rapidly.
Upon assuming power, African elites
confronted a number of inherently
contradictory tasks including; administrative consolidation, national integration, and economic development. They
found the bureaucratic-authoritarian
tradition of the colonial order and its
autocratic policies more readily conducive to achieving these tasks. Thus
within less than a decade, military rule
and single-party or no-party governments became a common feature of the
African political landscape.
If the character of post-colonial African states was shaped by colonialism,
postcolonial African societies were
also artificial entities in the sense that
they could not be considered nations.
Historically, a nation is a community
of people who develop solidarity
through shared language, custom and
institutions. A state, on the other hand,
is a legal institutional system claiming
sovereign power over a territory and
the population living within it. Over
time, as ethnic loyalty (nationalism)
fuses with state loyalty (patriotism),
nation and state bond. In Africa, however, colonial rule brought together a
hetereogeneous conglomeration of
peoples within a single territorial
administration. The drawing of district
and provincial boundaries that grouped
people by language and culture further
reinforced the existing differences between these peoples. Moreover, because economic growth, transportation networks and educational facilities were unevenly distributed within
individual colonies, some groups benefitted more than others, which only
served to accentuate ethnic differences
and heighten ethnic consciousness.
These contradictions between state
and society were nowhere more evident than in Nigeria, the largest of the
British colonies. In Nigeria, the British
brought together three major groups,
each with a distinct language, religion
. and form of political organization. In
the north, the Huasa-Fulani peoples
followed Islam and possessed a highly
centralized political system headed by
an aristocratic ruler (the emir) and
supported by an elaborate bureaucracy
16

Upon assuming power,
African elites confronted
a number of inherently
contradictory tasks including:
administrative consolidations,
national integration, and
economic development.

and army and a well-organized system
of taxation. In the west, the Yoruba
peoples possessed a loose confederal
political system headed by a symbolic
ruler (the ala[in), who was elected by
and was responsible to a council of
independent rulers (the obas). In the
east, the Ibo peoples lived in scattered
village communities, each with a decentralized republican form of government in which a council of village
elders made decisions for the whole
community on the basis of tradition
and consensus.
The uneven impact of British colonial policies only served to reinforce
these historical differences between the
three major ethnic groups in Nigeria.
For example, European educational
facilities and profitable commercial enterprises were concentrated largely in the
western and the eastern regions in
Nigeria during colonial rule. And because these two regions also had a
longer period of contact with and exposure to Europeans, dating back to
the era of the slave trade, the Yoruba
and Ibo peoples were quick to take
advantage of whatever limited opportunities were provided once Nigeria
officially became a colony in 1900. As
a result, these two groups were in an
advantageous position to take over the
reins of government from the British at
independence. In the north, however,
after the initial Hausa-Fulani opposition to being colonized was crushed
by military force, the British officials
retained the Hausa-Fulani rulers as
subordinate agents through whom colonial rule was enforced. As documented
in their diaries and memoirs, many
British officials posted in the north as
advisers to the Hausa-Fulani rulers saw
the Hausa-Fulani aristocracy as embodying the cultures and privileges of their
own aristocratic past. And many of
them were motivated to preserve these
aristocratic traditions by deliberately

~reventing the spread to northern
Nigeria of what they considered the
dehumanizing values of modern European societies. The net effect was that
northern Nigeria remained socially and
economically underdeveloped.
For example, at independence, there
was not a single senior Hausa-Fulani
officer in the Nigerian civil service or
the military. In 1957, three years before independence, there were less than
4,000 students enrolled in secondary
schools in the north, as compared to a
combined total of 28,000 in the east
and the west. Finally, in the early
1950s, out of a total of 160 physicians
in the country, 76 were Yorubas, 49
were Ibos, and only one was a HausaFulani (the rest were either Europeans,
Africans from outside Nigeria, or from
smaller ethnic groups within Nigeria).
Perhaps most critically for postcolonial politics, in the democratic
elections held in preparation for the
transfer of power, the Hausa-Fulani
leaders, as representatives of the single
largest ethnic group in Nigeria, won an
electoral majority and succeeded the
British at the helm of the state.
During the nationalist movements
for independence, however, ethnic rivalries were temporarily submerged in the
interest of confronting the colonial
powers with a united front. After
independence, with the moderating influence of the colonial state removed,
ethnicity resurged as a political force in
the competition for power and resources.
In Nigeria such competition erupted
into a disastrous civil war during 196770, when the Ibos made a futile attempt
to secede and form their own sovereign
nation-state of Biafra. As the example
from Nigeria shows, ethnic loyalties
are rooted in a system of personal
loyalties in which politically ambitious
patrons are obligated to reward the
political support of their clients with
preferential access to jobs, education
and investment funds. While corruption and inefficiency thus become built
into the operation of the state, ethnicbased allocation of resources reflects
attempts by public officials to coopt
otherwise powerful social groups and,
more generally, to shore up their precarious hold over a heterogeneous population. But such allocation procedures

waste valuable public resources, which
are necessary for long-term economic
and social development, for short-term
political gains. And as the limited
supply of resources dwindles state credibility and legitimacy are progressively
undermined.
Colonial rule thus contributed to the
crisis of African states in that it created
inherent political and social contradictions in these emerging societies. It
can also be argued, however, that some
of these effects were the consequences
of the social and economic policies
imposed on the colonies. Colonial policies conceived to attain two short-term
administrative goals:
1) organize local labor , commerce and
production in ways that pay for the
operation of the state and
2) maintain political control despite
the inevitable social dislocations caused
by changes in the economy.
These two goals were inherently contradictory, and colonial policies devised
to attain them produced correspondingly uneven results.
Colonial economic policies did not
encourage the growth of an industrial
economy in Africa. They focused, instead, on expanding the existing laborintensive, peasant-based agricultural production. African peasants were directly
(through laws) and indirectly (cash
payments of taxes, a colonial innovation) compelled to shift from food
production to cash crop production.
Marketing boards were established which
regularly paid African producers
below-world market prices for their
cash crops. Capital investments, where
permitted, was restricted to mining
concessions monopolized by European
firms (as in central and southern
Africa) and to large plantations owned
by white settlers (as in eastern Africa).
In Kenya, for example, African peasants
were legally prohibited from producing cash crops which would have competed with European production, and
were thus forced to work for low wages
in European-owned plantations. Opportunities for Africans to accumulate
equity capital were restricted almost
exclusively to the more high risk and
less profitable ventures-small-scale
commerce and transport-shunned by
Europeans.

It may be time to recognize
that whatever solutions exist,
they must come from
Africans themselves . ..

The net effect, on the one hand, was
that a dynamic class of capitalist entrepreneurs, the mainstay of democratic
states, failed to develop in Africa under
colonial rule. On the other hand, the
limited economic, particularly educational, opportunities provided during
two generations of colonial rule inevitably fostered a small indigenous middleclass. This educated African elite, composed of lawyers, doctors, civil servants and teachers, a politically vocal
segment of the native population, saw
the colonial state in ambivalent terms:
as a means to improve their own and
their societies' social and economic
well-being, and as an obstacle to such
improvements because it was controlled by Europeans. That this elite
spearheaded the nationalist movements was preordained by the contradictions inherent in the colonial situation.
Upon assuming control of the state
at independence, however, African elites
were confronted with a dilemma. How
could they use the state to satisfy their
peoples' heady expectations of democracy, freedom and prosperity, (expectations which they themselves had raised
during the nationalist stuggle) and also
advance their own class interests? In
Western Europe this dilemma had not
occurred because capitalist economies
and democratic states developed together. Elsewhere, in Japan and the
newly-industrializing countries of the
Third World (notably, Brazil, India,
Korea and Taiwan), state-led industrialization has fostered a robust middleclass and rapid economic growth. But
in Africa an authoritarian but minimal
colonial state disrupted the growth of a
capitalist economy. Efforts by postcolonial African elites to transform
their inherited states into engines of
economic growth have floundered. This
is caused in part by the fact that the
state's colonial-inspired institutions

are unsuited to the task, and in part by
the underlying s0cial and economic
conditions (ethnicity and limited resources) which severely restrict opportunities for generating the high rates of
savings and investment capital necessary for sustained economic growth
and development.
Conclusion
There can be no gainsaying that
African states are in a crisis. So far,
explanations of this crisis remain intellectually misguided, historically shortsighted and analytically simplistic. This
article has suggested that at least part of
the explanation may be found in Africa's
colonial experience, particularly the
structure and policies of those colonial
powers.
After identifying the cause and the
nature of the immense problems that
face African leaders and their peoples,
observers are wont to recommend solutions. It may be time to recognize that
whatever solutions exist, they must
come from Africans themselves, albeit,
with a good deal of outside help. If the
past contains any lesson for outsiders
who, like the colonial rulers, claim to
know what is best for Africans, it is a
lesson which must evoke a sense of
humility. Perhaps the most appropriate lesson is contained in an African
proverb: "No condition is permanent."
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